JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. The results derived by Nordhaus from these assumptions are well known. The incumbent stimulates the economy close to election time in order to increase its chances of reelection. At the beginning of the new term, the inflationary effects of the pre-electoral expansion are eliminated with a recession. The behavior of the two parties is identical, and a cycle results in equilibrium. The empirical evidence in support of the "political business cycle" theory is inconclusive for the United States case: several empirical studies have rejected this theory.
Given these rejections, some authors have moved toward a "partisan theory" of macroeconomic policy. The original proponent of this view was Hibbs ( 1977) , who argued that the Democratic party in the United States and socialist parties in Europe have been more averse to unemployment and less averse to inflation than the Republican party in the United States and conservative parties in Europe. This theory has been tested empirically by Hibbs and others, using models based on an exploitable Phillips curve with very little consideration for the ratiQnal .
. . expectatlons crltlque.
In this paper a model closely related to that of Alesina (1987) is presented and tested on post-Second World War United States data. The model is based on a "partisan view" of political parties and it accounts for rational and forwardlooking expectations. In our model only "unexpected policy" matters: the economy would exhibit complete policy neutrality in a one-party system with no elections. However, the elections create an important source of uncertainty: the public does not know which party will be in office in the future. If the relevant expectations about monetary policy and inflation have to be formed before the elections, then they are based on the average of the policies that the two parties are expected to follow if elected. If these policies are different, the elected party creates a "surprise," in the sense that its policy was not correctly predicted, since expectations accounted for the possibility of the election of the other party. The model, then, predicts that at the beginning of the term of office of the more expansionary party one should observe an output expansion above trend with high money growth; when the less expansionary party is elected, a recession with low money growth should be observed. There are no electoral surprises in the second part of the terms of office; hence, in the second part of both types of administrations real variables should exhibit the same behavior (ceteris paribus).
Starting from an explicit maximization problem, we derive the reaction functions of the two parties and their time-consistent policies and test the nonlinear restrictions on the parameters imposed by the theory. The data reject the hypothesis that macroeconomic outcomes have been the same under the two types of administration. The Democratic party has been relatively more concerned than the Republican party about the output target rather than the inflation/ money creation target. Furthermore, the empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that systematic differences in output growth have occurred in the first half of the administrations and not in the second, in accordance with the theory. Thus, these results are consistent with a partisan view of monetary policy. An exception to this conclusion is perhaps the first Nixon administration, the behavior of which is probably better explained by a "political business cycle" view. This paper is organized in four sections and the final summary. Section 1 briefly reviews some of the recent empirical literature on the subject. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 provides empirical evidence in accordance with the qualitative implications of the model. In section 4 the empirical estimates of the parameters of the model are presented and discussed.
POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY AND PARTISAN THEORY
In his seminal article, Nordhaus (1975) 3Their approach is related to ours, however, they do not explicitly derive parties' policy rules from a maximization problem. They also model expectations differently and focus on unemployment rather than output.
4In this paper we provide a different formalization of a PT of monetary policy; these two approaches have to be viewed as complementary. Also, the empirical implications of Havrilesky's model are not identical to those of our model. For example, in Havrilesky's model monetary surprise should be observed only when there is a change from a Republican to a Democratic administration (and vice versa). Our model predicts that monetary surprises should be observed even if the same party is reappointed for a second term.
THE MODEL
We consider an economy with two parties, denoted with obvious reference, party D and party R. The two parties assign different weights to two policy targets: an inflation rate or money growth target and an output growth target. The policy instrument controlled by the policymaker is the rate of money creation. A quadratic specification for the objective functions of the two parties is adopted: the loss function of the two parties can be written as (the superscripts identify the party) keeps the algebra simpler, saves degrees of freedom, and it should not affect qualitatively the empirical results. The choice of a target and the specification of the model in terms of rate of growth instead of level of GNP is imposed by theoretical and empirical considerations. If a target in level of output were chosen, we would need a more complex dynamic structure for the supply equations, involving one or more lags, for example. This procedure would be too costly in terms of degrees of freedom. Finally, no distinction is made between the "administration" and the Central Bank. The implicit assumption is that the administration has some direct or indirect control over monetary policy, despite the relative independence of the Federal Reserve.6
As long as ¢ > y(t) and b and dare positive, both parties face the problem of dynamic inconsistency of optimal monetary policy, as pointed out originally by Kydland and Prescott ( 1977) . If the targeted level of output growth, ¢, is higher than the growth rate generated by the market, y(t), the policymaker has an incentive to create policy surprises in order to approach the target. In fact, by substituting (3) into (1) and (2), one gets, after rearranging,
E q t a (m -P(t))2 + b (m, -m'-k(t))2 j; (4) Z = E q' [ 2 (m, -t(t))2 + d (m,-m,-k(t))2 ] (5)
where b = boy 2, d = doy 2, and k(t) = (¢-y(t))/^y. In (4) and (5) k(t) represents the difference between the rate of output growth targeted by the policymakers and the rate of growth generated by the economy. The former is likely to be greater than the latter if the latter is "too low" because of distortions in the labor market.7 In order to identify the problem of dynamic inconsistency, consider, for example, party D acting as a social planner with no elections. If this party could make a binding commitment, it would choose to commit to the rule: mt = t(t). This rule is obtained by minimizing (4), taking account of the rationality of expectations, i.e., mt = m t. However, binding commitments are hardly available: the policymaker can always change both itQ riind and the law. Then the time consistent rate of money growth has to be found by minimizing (4) 
In (7) Let us now consider the interaction of the two parties. We assume that elections take place every two periods and are held at the beginning of the period.
After the elections of, say, time t, the elected party chooses its policy for period t, i.e., m D for party D and m R for party R. Voters are rational and informed about the objectives of the two parties, i.e., they know (4) and (5). A rational citizen votes for the party that is expected to deliver the highest utility for himself; thus, every voter forms expectations about the policies that the two parties would follow if electeci qna votes accordingly. Since the voters know the objectives of the two parties, they know with certainty how the two parties would act when in office. However, even if voters have perfect foresight, electoral outcomes remain uncertain if there is uncertainty about the distribution of voters preferences. We indicate with P and ( I -P) the probability of electing party D and R respectively given that voters have perfect foresight about the two parties' policies. We also assume that the value of P is known by the public. It is important to stress that P is not a function of current or past policies because the voters do not need this information to form expectations about future policies: all they need is the knowledge of the parties preferences [(1) and (2)] and of the structure of the economy (3). Thus, for the purpose of this paper P can be considered an exogenous parameter, related to the underlying information about voters' preferenences. Alesina (1986) provides a more detailed treatment of this model of political competition.8 8An additional source of uncertainty about electoral outcome may be due to uncertainty about the number of abstentions. Note also that we are assuming that electoral uncertainty does not disappear over time. Our assumptions about voting makes it impossible for the two parties to engage in PBC policies a la Nordhaus. Rational and informed voters would not be "fooled" into voting for the incumbent by an expansion placed close to election time. The two parties cannot even take advantage of superior information as in Rogoff and Sibert (1986) , since voters are assumed to be perfectly informed about the state of the economy. Thus, our formulation implies that the two parties are "locked" into following their partisan policies.
If party D is elected, it minimizes (4). The first-order condition is mD= (l-g)t(t)
F; rey and Schneider ( 1978) present an interesting blend of the PT and the PBC approach. They assume that each administration follows its own ideological policy only when its popularity is high; when popularity is low, the policymakers react by choosing policies that increase voters' support, regardless of "ideology." Furthermore, popularity tends to be preferred to ideology close to elections. The approach of Frey and Schneider differs from ours in two crucial respects: first, they assume that voters are not fully informed about the government's performance and objectives and that simple "rules" govern voting behavior.9 The second difference is that Frey and Schneider assume that parties follow a "satisficing" rather then an optimizing behavior. Table 3 
Analogous results are obtained by this additional test. The quarterly GNP at 1972 prices has been regressed on eight lagged values, a time trend, a dummy for the oil shocks (OILSH), and two dummies for the first half of the administrations of the two parties. In

TABLE 4 POST-SECOND WORLD WAR RECESSIONS
The dummy variable for Republican administrations, R, assumes the value of 1 during Republican administrations and zero otherwise. The coefficient of this variable is negative, as predicted by the theory, and statistically significant at the 5 percent level using a one-sided test. As expected, there is a highly significant trend.
The second empirical implication for money growth is that one should observe a larger deviation from trend in the second half of a Democratic administration than in the first. In a Republican administration, instead, the opposite should In (25) and (26) KN is a dummy assuming the value of-1 in the two periods of the Kennedy administration and 1 in the second period of the Nixon administration. In (25) the dummy KN is added to the regression (23): the coefficient on KN is positive and strongly significant. In (26) the dummy KN is added to the regression (24). Note that the coeff1cients on R 1 and R2 become more significant and virtually identical. It is interesting to note, for future reference, that the model predicts that for h=0 these two coefficients should be equal.
We have also examined the unexpected money variable, DMR, constructed by Barro (1978) . This variable is obtained from the residual of a regression of the rate of money growth, M1, on several lagged variables assumed to be in the relevant information set of the economic agents. l l Biannual averages of this variable (DMR) are reported in Table S (this variable is not available after 1976 ).
Barro's unexpected money variable is not consistent with our definition of "unexpected money" since we do not rely upon lagged values to compute expected money. This difference may explain why Barro does not find monetary "surprises" only in the first half of the terms of office, but also in the second halves, as shown in Table 5 
ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL
The empirical evidence in the preceding section suggests that the model is broadly in accordance with the data. In fact, the cross-equation restrictions imposed by the theory cannot be rejected. The system of equations (13) Table 6 . The log-likelihood test does not reject the restrictions imposed by the theory at the S percent confidence level. The estimated values of h and g do not reject the partisan hypothesis. In fact, the parameter h = dPy 2/ (c+d) is insignificantly different from zero while g = bPy 2/ (a+ b) is positive and strongly significant. The relative magnitude of g and h is then consistent with the hypothesis that Democratic administrations have attributed relatively more weight to the output target than Republican administrations, which, instead, have been concerned mainly (or only, strictly speaking) with the money growth target. The estimated value of P, the probability of electing a Democratic administration, is high (0.81), implying that Republican administrations have always been elected with a certain amount of "surprise." The value of this parameter is due to the fact that the deviations from trend of output growth at the beginning of Republican administrations have been on average larger (in absolute value) than the same deviations at the beginning of Democratic administrations. This observation was already apparent from the result of the regressions (21) and (22) and from Tables 2 and 3 . In our stylized model this asymmetry can only be captured by a high P, implying, ceteris paribus, more surprise when a Republican president is elected, and, therefore, stronger effects on output of monetary policy. However, in a more general model, the same phenomenon could be explained by an asymmetric effect of negative versus positive monetary shocks due, for example, to different degrees of price flexibility upward or downward. Needless to say, the probability P is, in general, different in every election. The relationship between poll predictions about electoral outcomes and effects of policies "surprises" needs further investigation in the context of this model. 12 The value of y (4.26) is plausible and statistically significant (see Table 2 In order to test this conjecture we have estimated the model holding k fixed at several different values. If one holds k fixed, the estimates of y becomes much more significant. Furthermore, as expected, if k is raised, oy falls while the other parameters remain plausible as in Table 6 and the log-likelihood function remains virtually unchanged for a relevant range of values of k.l3 In Table 7 we report the results obtained by fixing k = 0.75. The value of y falls to 3.17 and becomes statistically significant. This estimates for the effect of unanticipated money on output growth (^y) is not inconsistent with the findings of Barro (1978) .14 These value of y and k imply a "bliss point" of output growth (@ of 12The high value of P is probably model-specific. For example, a richer structure of lags in the supply equation would affect (and presumably would lower) its value. Table 6 . The only significant difference is that both P and g are lower. However, g is clearly still positive, thus, greater than h as implied by the "partisan theory," and P remains high (clearly greater than 1/2). new regime the same expansionary policy has little if any effect on real variables, i.e., the Phillips curve is more (or completely) vertical. Conversely, there are short-term output losses when an administration more concerned with inflation is elected because inflationary expectations have been raised by the administration more concerned with output growth. These results suggest that a "partisan theory" of economic policy contributes to the explanation of macroeconomic outcomes in the United States. 
